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INTERNATIONAL TORT LIABILITY
DAVID SHEA BETTWY*
"There is always a first time for litigation to enforce a norm; there
has to be." - Judge Richard A. Posner
I. INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 2 poses a litigation risk to corporations
whose domestic operations connected to conduct abroad that violates
international law. The most likely target of future ATS litigation is U.S.
private military companies (PMCs), especially those involved in the
manufacture and deployment of drones. This is a result of recent case
law clarifying the extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute
and the current U.S. national military strategy to rely on the use of
J.D., University of California, Berkeley; LL.M., International Human Rights
Law, National University of Ireland, Galway; B.A., University of Notre Dame.
1. Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 2012).
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"remotely operated vehicles and technologies." 3  Judge-made
international tort law has exposed corporations to the risk of ATS
litigation, beginning with the 1980 Filcirtiga v. Peila-Irala4 decision
and leading up, most recently, to the 2013 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. 5 decision.
So far, corporations have escaped serious exposure to civil liability
under the ATS. But the risk of civil international tort liability has
recently increased due to the evolution of case law on aiding-and-
abetting liability. Given the state of case law, including the Kiobel
decision regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality, PMCs are
especially vulnerable to civil liability.
Section II of this article examines the evolution of judge-made
international tort law through the ATS, from the 1980 Filcirtiga
decision to the 2013 Kiobel decision. Section III examines the history
of ATS litigation against corporations. Further, Section IV is a
discussion of how the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kiobel
regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality has opened the
door to ATS litigation against corporations with sufficient contacts in
the United States. Finally, Section V discusses ATS litigation against
PMCs, particularity those involved in the production and use of drones,
and why Kiobel makes PMCs prime targets of future ATS litigation.
II. EVOLUTION OF JUDGE-MADE CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE ATS
In 2004, just as ATS litigation was waning after a promising start
in 1980, the Supreme Court seemed to strike the final blow in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain,6 stating that the ATS does not create a cause of
action.7 That statement was illusory and ironic, however, because the
Court also ruled that the ATS is a conduit through which U.S. courts
may "recognize" private rights of action for violations of customary
international law.
3. JoINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1, 16 (2015), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/
Documents/Publications/2015_NationalMilitaryStrategy.pdf.
4. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
6. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
7. Id. at 742.
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But for the ATS, violations of international law are not actionable
for monetary damages in U.S. courts. Sosa is therefore to international
tort liability as Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents ofFederal Bureau
ofNarcotics8 is to constitutional tort liability. In Bivens, the Court used
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a conduit (or excuse) to create an analogous federal
cause of action.9 The Sosa Court used the ATS to create a new body of
federal tort law that derives from customary international law. The rule
in Sosa, combined with settled law that corporations can be held
criminally liable for violations of international law' 0 and circuit court
rulings that that there can be civil liability under the ATS for aiding and
abetting," has opened the door to lawsuits against corporations for
violations of certain norms of international law.
The Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Kiobel'2 is the latest phase
of the assembly line of decisions that have resulted in judge-made
international tort law. The Court held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to the ATS.13 Despite stating a rule that seems
to foreclose ATS litigation, the Court also defined when the
presumption against extraterritoriality can be overcome, namely when
the tortfeasor's conduct occurs within the United States and causes
injuries abroad. The ATS therefore poses a litigation risk to
corporations that make decisions in the United States related to conduct
abroad that potentially violates international law.
A. Filartiga and the Rise of the ATS
The ATS is a federal U.S. statute that provides subject-matter
jurisdiction to national courts over "any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."' 4 The statute was dormant for nearly two centuries after
it was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.15 But, in 1980, the
8. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
9. Id. at 399.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 123-3 1.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 132-42.
12. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
13. Id. at 1665.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 2012).
15. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2010).
3
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld federal jurisdiction
under the ATS against a former Paraguayan law enforcement officer
who tortured and killed the plaintiffs son outside the United States. 16
Before the Second Circuit brought life to the ATS in Fildirtiga in
1980, it had rejected ATS claims in 1976, finding that neither "the law
of nations" nor U.S. treaties provided any private rights of action.17 In
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, a Second Circuit panel held that "[i]t is only when
a treaty is self-executing, when it prescribes rules by which private
rights may be determined, that it may be relied upon for the enforcement
of such rights."18 And as with treaties, "the law of nations has been held
not to be self-executing so as to vest a plaintiff with individual legal
rights."19
Four years later in Fildrtiga, however, the Second Circuit
recognized a cause of action under international law for a plaintiff
whose son was tortured and killed.20 The panel held that the plaintiff
had stated a cause of action arising under various international human
rights documents as well as the ATS. 21 The panel did not question
whether the plaintiff had a private right of action as it did in 1976 in
Dreyfus, but focused instead on whether the alleged torture violated
customary international law. 22 It distinguished previous ATS cases,
including Dreyfus, by pointing out that the claims in those cases did not
involve well-established and universally recognized norms of
international law such as the prohibition against torture.23 Under
Filcirtiga, therefore, plaintiffs do not need to establish a private right of
action to state a claim under the ATS; they need only allege conduct
that violates the law of nations. 24
16. Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
17. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1976).
18. Id. at 30.
19. Id.
20. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 881-82.
23. Id. at 884-85.
24. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
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B. Tel-Oren, Bivens, and the Decline of the ATS
In his 1984 concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic,25 however, Judge Bork argued that Fildrtiga should be
limited, echoing Dreyfus's holding that ATS claims must rest on an
express or implied cause of action.26 The plaintiffs alleged in Tel-Oren
that the Palestine Liberation Organization had committed violations of
international law, including genocide and torture, and conceded that
they "ha[d] not been granted a cause of action by federal statute or by
international law itself." 27 First, Judge Bork pointed out that none of the
U.S. treaties cited by the plaintiffs granted them an express or implied
cause of action.28 Second, he rejected the view that international law
automatically provides a cause of action by being part of federal
common law. As Bork explained, neither the federal question statute 29
nor the ATS creates a cause of action, 30 and there is no norm of
customary international law that creates an exception to the general rule
that international law does not provide private rights of action.31
Judge Bork entertained the possibility that, at the time of enacting
the ATS, legislators intended the statute to grant jurisdiction to federal
courts to "recognize" existing private rights of action for certain torts,
namely "[v]iolation of safe-conducts," "[i]nfringement of the rights of
ambassadors," and "[p]iracy." 32 But he maintained that customary
international law has never provided for "any recognition of a right of
private parties to recover." 33 He noted that while "substantive rules of
international law may evolve ... that does not solve the problem of the
existence of a cause of action." 34 In sum, while the Fildrtiga court
silently presumed that a violation of international law gave rise to a
25. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
26. Id. at 812 (Bork, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 801.
28. Id. at 808 ("Absent authorizing legislation, an individual has access to
courts for enforcement of a treaty's provisions only when the treaty is self-executing,
that is, when it expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action.").
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (West 2012).
30. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 811 (Bork, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 816-17.
32. Id. at 811-13.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 816.
5
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private right of action, Judge Bork reasoned that the ATS permits courts
to recognize a cause of action for international tort only when Congress
or a norm of customary international law expressly provides a private
right of action.
Judge Bork's concurring opinion propagated the jurisdiction-only
interpretation of the ATS 35 and influenced Congress' passage of the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) in 1992.36 His pushback against
Fildrtiga, which had provided torture victims civil damages under the
ATS, created uncertainty that Congress sought to clarify.37 While
Congress believed the ATS "should remain intact to permit suits based
on other norms ... of customary international law," 38 it passed the
TVPA to ensure that torture victims had an unambiguous cause of
action, given Judge Bork's prerequisite of an "explicit grant ... by a
state, by Congress, by a treaty, or by international law." 39
Congress' torture legislation, despite the view that the ATS was
still operational, may have also reflected recognition that courts were
increasingly restrained from inferring or creating causes of action-a
trend that would continue through the 2004 Sosa decision. The Supreme
Court established a judge-made cause of action in 1971 for Fourth
Amendment violations of the U.S. Constitution in Bivens,40 which was
subsequently extended to Fifth and Eighth Amendment violations.41
However, as the late Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Sosa,
35. See generally Bradford Clark, Tel-Oren, Fildrtiga, and the Meaning of the
Alien Tort Statute, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 177, 177 (2013) (arguing that Bork's
opinion "more accurately anticipated how the Supreme Court would ultimately
interpret the statute" than Filartiga); Kedar Bhatia, Reconsidering the Purely
Jurisdictional View of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 447, 465-69,
472-73 (2013) (describing the impact of Judge Bork's purely jurisdictional view on
subsequent ATS case law).
36. TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, H.R. Res. 2092, 102d Cong.,
106 Stat. 73 (1992).
37. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3-4 (1991); see also Ekaterina Apostolova,
Comment, The Relationship between the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim
Protection Act, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 640, 642 (2010).
38. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4.
39. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801, 804 (Bork, J., concurring).
40. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971).
41. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 18-23 (1980).
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"the ground supporting [Bivens] has eroded" since.42 Courts could not
extend Bivens causes of action to new contexts if "Congress ha[d]
provided an alternative remedy" to substitute recovery directly under
the Constitution, or if there were "special factors counseling hesitation
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." 43 In 1983 the
Supreme Court declined to extend Bivens in a First Amendment case,
deferring to Congress to "create a new substantive legal liability" for a
First Amendment violation.44
As for the ATS, the separation-of-powers problems and risks of
adverse foreign policy consequences that concerned Judge Bork in Tel-
Oren45 certainly could have constituted "special factors counseling
hesitation" to establish a new cause of action. The Supreme Court has
since declined to extend Bivens causes of action to new contexts. 46 In
reflection, Scalia wrote in 2001 that "Bivens is a relic of the heady days
in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of
action-decreeing them to be 'implied' by the mere existence of a
statutory or constitutional prohibition."47
Courts were also restrained from inferring or finding "implied"
statutory causes of action at the time of TVPA's passage. The Supreme
Court had effectively ended the "Borak era," 48 during which courts
could infer a cause of action if it would further the legislative purpose
of the statute. 49 In its 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash,50 the Court provided
42. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 742 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
43. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
44. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983).
45. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring).
46. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) ("The caution toward
extending Bivens remedies into any new context, a caution consistently and repeatedly
recognized for three decades, forecloses such an extension here."). See also Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994) (holding that a Bivens action
cannot be brought against a federal agency).
47. Corr. Servs. Corp., 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
48. See Tom Gardner, Note, The New Face of Implied Right to Sue
Jurisprudence and the SEC's Best-Price Rule, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 495, 502 (2009).
See also Lumen N. Mulligan, Federal Courts Not Federal Tribunals, 104 Nw. U. L.
REV. 175, 182-83 (2010).
49. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
50. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
72016]
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a four-factor test for finding implied, statutory causes of action, but
emphasized strict application5 ' and raised separation-of-powers
concerns. 52 The Court further limited the Cort test in 1979, stating that
"[t]he ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme
that Congress enacted into law." 53 Professor Lumen Mulligan wrote
that, "[a]lthough the Court ... continued to infer causes of action on
occasion [after Touche Ross & Co.], it has generally disapproved of the
practice." 54 Finally, in 2001, the Court declined to infer a private right
of action from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.55 Writing for
the Court, Justice Scalia ruled that "the text and structure" of the statute
did not contain "rights-creating language" nor revealed "congressional
intent to create a private right of action." 56 He propagated a strictly
textualist approach to finding causes of action, writing that
"'contemporary legal context' . . . matters only to the extent it clarifies
text." 57 In sum, Bork's refusal to read causes of action into the ATS in
1984, as well as the passage of the TVPA in 1992, reflect an increasing
hesitation to find implied causes of action, such as in Borak, or create
new causes of action, such as in Filartiga.
51. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) ("[I]t
suffices to say that in a series of cases since Borak we have adhered to a stricter
standard for the implication of private causes of action.").
52. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
53. Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 578; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It could not be plainer that we
effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. ... converting
one of its four factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the
other three merely indicative of its presence or absence.").
54. Mulligan, supra note 48, at 183; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 396 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that the Court generally refused to create
new causes of action under the Cort test); Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional
Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Rights ofAction, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 861, 870-71 (1996) ("[R]ecent cases suggest that a private plaintiff has no cause
of action unless the statute grants one or there is clear congressional intent to grant
one.").
55. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
56. Id. at 288-89.
57. Id. at 288.
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C. Resurrection of the ATS
Despite the Supreme Court's efforts, led by Justice Scalia, to end
the practice of creating new causes of action or finding implied causes
of action, its 2004 Sosa decision established a new body of international
tort law based on judge-made causes of action. The Court held that
federal courts are permitted to "recognize private causes of action" for
"torts in violation of the law of nations," as long as claims based on
present-day international law rest on a norm of international law as
definite and specific as the eighteenth-century norms that constituted
the law of nations at the time the ATS was enacted.58 Writing for the
majority, Justice Souter reasoned that the ATS was enacted "on the
understanding that common law would provide a cause of action for ...
international law violations thought to carry personal liability at the
time," 59 which according to William Blackstone, included "violation of
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy." 60
After all, the reasonable inference from history and practice is that the
ATS was "intended to have practical effect the moment it became
law." 61
Given that "the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action," 62 it would have made sense to conclude that the
ATS's scope was limited to allowing courts to recognize existing
common law causes of action, namely Blackstone's three international
torts. But, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurrence, Justice
Souter assumed that the common law at present was able to create new
causes of action, 63 despite overwhelming precedent disfavoring judge-
made causes of action. Justice Souter shrugged off Malesko 64 and
Sandoval,65 two cases that cautioned against extending Bivens to create
58. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 692, 724-25 (2004).
59. Id. at 724.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Post-Erie federal common
lawmaking . .. is so far removed from that general-common-law adjudication which
applied the 'law of nations' that it would be anachronistic to find authorization to do
the former in a statutory grant of jurisdiction that was thought to enable the latter.").
64. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).
65. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
92016]
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causes of action. in new contexts. Souter advised caution in "making
international rules privately actionable," but opined that "the absence
of congressional action addressing private rights of action under an
international norm is more equivocal than its failure to provide such a
right when it creates a statute." 66 Moreover, in upholding the creation
of new causes of action upon "the reasonable inference ... that the ATS
was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law," 67
Justice Souter effectively reverted to the Borak era by inferring a cause
of action where it would further the legislative purpose of the statute.
Justice Souter's lose-the-battle-but-win-the-war approach is
reminiscent of Marbury v. Madison, where the Court established its
power of judicial review by striking down a law that gave the Court
power to issue a writ of mandamus. 68 The Sosa Court explicitly refused
to recognize a cause of action through the ATS for arbitrary arrest, but
effectively authorized future judge-made private rights causes of action
for international torts. Justice Scalia exposed this approach in his
concurrence, writing that "[t]he Court masks the novelty of its approach
when it suggests . . . the door is still ajar" to "recognition of actionable
international norms." 69 The door was shut, Justice Scalia argued, when
the Court terminated general common law in Erie R. Co. v.
Thompkins.70 Despite Scalia's contentions, courts after Sosa may create
causes of action for violations of international norms as definite and
specific as those contemplated at the ATS's inception.
Since Sosa, the creation of new causes of action has been a foregone
conclusion, although courts have recognized that Sosa's universal-and-
specific standard offers limited flexibility in declaring norms of
customary international law. For example, one district court determined
that a defendant's conduct constituted cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, but ultimately decided that the conduct did not survive "the
rigorous Sosa requirements." 7 Environmental claims have failed under
66. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
67. Id. at 724.
68. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
69. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 746 (Scalia, J., concurring).
70. Id.; 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71. Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 360-61 (D.N.J. 2004).
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the Sosa standard. 72 Human rights claims as a proxy for environmental
torts have also failed, such as in a Second Circuit case against chemical
companies that produced Agent Orange, a highly toxic defoliant
deployed by the United States during the Vietnam War.73 Nevertheless,
since Sosa, courts have employed the ATS to identify several actionable
norms of customary international law, including: crimes against
humanity; 74 genocide;75 war crimes;76 torture; 77 cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment; 78 prolonged arbitrary detention; 79 forced labor;80
72. See Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 09-495, 2010 WL 3893791, at *3 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 30, 2010).
73. Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d
104, 119 (2d Cir. 2008). See also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004,
1024-25 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting environmental tort claims that invoke the rights
to life and health).
74. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 453 F. Supp.
2d 633, 638-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir.
2011); In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2011);
Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316 (D. Mass. 2013)
(finding that "[w]idespread, systematic persecution of LGBTI people constitutes a
crime against humanity that unquestionably violates international norms").
75. See, e.g., Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co.,
517 F.3d 104, 116-117 (2d Cir. 2008).
76. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 743-44 (9th Cir. 2011); In
re Chiquita Brands Intern., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
77. See, e.g., Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2010),
rev'd on other grounds, 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce, 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005).
78. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1093 (N.D. Cal.
2008), aff'd on other grounds, 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010) (severe beatings and
confinement); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (sexual abuse);
Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 756 (D. Md. 2010) (beatings, electric
shocks, threats of rape, mock executions). But see, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that an eight-hour
forced detention did not constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment).
79. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 466
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that arbitrary detention can violate a norm of international
law when it is prolonged).
80. See, e.g., Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (S.D.
Fla. 2008).
112016]
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human trafficking; 8' extrajudicial killing; 82 aircraft hijacking; 83
arbitrary denationalization; 84  nonconsensual medical
experimentation;85 child labor; 86 and child sexual abuse.87 The majority
of these lawsuits were brought against multinational corporations
(MNCs).
III. ATS LITIGATION AGAINST MNCS
Filcirtiga established the ATS as a way for human rights plaintiffs
to obtain civil damages for violations of international law.88 Practically,
it gave U.S. federal courts universal jurisdiction over international law
claims, particularly those arising in countries where justice systems are
inadequate. 89 It also demonstrated the potential for substantial damages
under the ATS. 90
Courts were initially slow to appreciate the novelty of holding
corporations liable for violations of international law. But ATS
plaintiffs relentlessly targeted corporations, and courts began adopting
theories of corporate liability. A corporation can be held liable for
violations of international law under any of the following
circumstances: (1) acting "under color of official authority"; (2) acting
81. See, e.g., id. at 1358.
82. See, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898-99 (W.D. Tenn.
2005); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178-79 (C.D.
Cal. 2005).
83. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539,
565 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
84. See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
85. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 180-81 (2d Cir. 2009).
86. See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2010), rev'd
on other grounds, 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
87. See M.C. v. Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d 127, 132-33 (E.D. Pa. 2011). But see
Cisneros v. Aragon, 485 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the alleged
sexual abuse of a minor did not violate a norm of customary international law).
88. See Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be
Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 927, 937 (1998) ("The [ATS] provides one possible solution to the
present-day inability to hold an MNC accountable for human rights violations.").
89. See Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(acknowledging that "further resort to [Paraguayan courts] would be futile").
90. Id. at 867 (entering judgment for over $10 million).
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where an applicable norm of international law extends to private actors,
regardless of whether acting with color of authority; or (3) aiding and
abetting violations of international law by a foreign government.
A. Impact of Corporate Liability
Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 predicted in
2003 that the ATS would spawn a new body of mass tort litigation
comparable in impact to asbestos tort litigation: "This one-sentence
law ... could plausibly culminate in a nightmare, more than 200 years
after it was enacted." 91 The authors suggested that, theoretically,
100,000 class action plaintiffs in China could sue American companies
for aiding and abetting China's human rights violations for $6 billion in
actual damages and $20 billion in punitive damages. 92 They also
compared the potential costs of ATS litigation to those of asbestos
litigation, noting that ATS litigation could "clog the courts and run up
massive costs because [ATS trials] involve numerous prediscovery
motions, overseas discovery, expert witnesses in foreign and
international law, and near certainty of appeal." 93
The business community embraced Awakening Monster as part of
a movement to reform the ATS. 9 4 But its conclusions are largely
speculative, 95 especially regarding massive damages awards, which are
usually difficult to enforce. John Bellinger, former Legal Adviser to the
U.S. Secretary of State, commented that "ATS litigation has not
91. GARY HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS MrROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER:
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 1, 1 (2003).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 14. See also Konrad L. Cailteux & B. Keith Gibson, "Alien Tort
Statute" Shakedown: Court Must Arrest New Attempt to Expand Mischievous U.S.
Law, 20 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1, 1 (Jan. 14, 2005),
www.wlf.org/upload/011405LBCailteux.pdf (noting the "influx of cases has cost
[U.S.] corporations significant, unnecessary costs in legal fees, discovery costs, and
lost employee time").
94. Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost ofAlien Tort Litigation: A Response
to Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
1, 4 (2004). See Joshua Kurlantzick, Taking Multinationals to Court: How the Alien
Tort Act Promotes Human Rights, 21 WORLD POL'Y J. 60, 64 (2004).
95. Id. at 39.
132016]
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produced large judgments that can realistically be executed," and "it
does not provide any effective relief in the vast majority of cases." 96
But damages awards are not the only cost to ATS defendants. Even
when plaintiffs lose, "they will have succeeded in making the
companies expend substantial resources to fight the lawsuits and
burnish their public image," which could in turn affect stock value.97
Regarding ATS litigation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce remarked,
"U.S. companies lose even if they win!"98 Human rights plaintiffs may
be more motivated by the "vindication and psychological redress"
resulting from a favorable judgment than by damages awards anyway.99
And in cases where the host state's judicial resources are inadequate,
the ATS may be the only realistic means available of suing a
corporation for human rights violations. Indeed, one commentator
counted a total of 173 opinions by U.S. courts in cases brought under
the ATS from 1980 to 2011.100 While one might have expected ATS
lawsuits to decrease after the Supreme Court's 2004 Sosa decision,
which imposed a high standard for bringing ATS claims, ATS litigation
"continues largely unabated."101 That may be a result of Sosa's lack of
specificity with regard to which claims are actionable, or even a product
of sheer abuse of the statute. 102
ATS litigation against corporations has also resulted in large
settlements in some cases. For example, although the settlement terms
were confidential, reports suggested that Unocal Corporation settled for
about $30 million with U.S. human rights groups that represented
Burmese villagers who were allegedly enslaved by the Burmese
96. John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad:
The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 8
(2008); see also MICHAEL KOEBELE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE 90 n.10 (2009) (listing compensatory and punitive damage amounts
for numerous ATS plaintiffs, noting, however, that "actual recovery of damages was
rare").
97. Duruigbo, supra note 94, at 39.
98. John E. Howard, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Is Our Litigation, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Oct. 8, 2002), https://www.uschamber.com/op-ed/alien-
tort-claims-act-our-litigation.
99. Duruigbo, supra note 94, at 37.
100. Julian Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort
Statute: A Flawed System ofJudicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 353, 357 (2011).
101. Bellinger, supra note 96, at 2.
102. See Cailteux & Gibson, supra note 93.
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military to clear jungle to construct a natural gas pipeline in the
1990S.1 0 3 In 2003, retailers and manufacturers including The Gap, J.
Crew, Tommy Hilfiger and Target settled for about $20 million with
class action plaintiffs alleging sweatshop abuse in Saipan.1 04 And in
2009, the Center of Constitutional Rights agreed to settle with Shell Oil
Company for $15.5 million after bringing suit against the company for
complicity in human rights violations against the Ogoni people in
Nigeria. 0 5
Until recently, courts struggled with the issue of whether domestic
or international law determines corporate liability under the ATS. In a
footnote in Sosa, the Supreme Court suggested that international law-
in which corporate liability is less certain-is the appropriate source of
law.106 But after years of confusion, courts have come to a consensus
that corporations can be held liable under the ATS, no matter the source
of law.
C. Rise of Corporate Liability Under the ATS
For decades, courts presumed without further inquiry that
corporations could be held liable for violations of international law
under the ATS.1 07 While it is well-settled in the United States that a
corporation is a legal person, the legal personality of corporations under
103. WILLIAM ACEVES, THE ANATOMY OF TORTURE: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF FILARTIGA V. PENA-IRALA 107 (2007).
104. The court, however, found that "there was minimal success in the outcome
of this litigation as originally contemplated by the plaintiffs," noting that plaintiffs
received only 2% of what they originally sought. Does I v. The Gap, Inc., No. CV-
01-0031, 2003 WL 22997250 at *1 (D.N. Mar. I. Sept. 11, 2003).
105. Statement of Plaintiffs, Center for Constitutional Rights (Jun 8, 2009),
available at http://ccrjustice.org/Wiwa (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). See Wiwa v. Shell
Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria Ltd., 335 Fed. Appx. 81 (2d Cir. 2009).
106. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) (The Supreme
Court did not directly address corporate liability, but noted with respect to whether a
norm of international law is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action that "[a]
related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private
actor such as a corporation or individual.").
107. See Ku, supra note 100, at 354 n.1 (listing ATS cases since 1999 holding
private corporations subject to customary international law); Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F.
Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (first reported case against a corporate defendant).
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international law is unsettled.' 08 The prosecution of Nazi officers in the
Nuremberg trials after World War II is noted for extending international
law to cover individuals, not just states. 109 However, the implications
for corporate liability under international law are debated. 110 No
corporations were tried, and "the record contains no suggestion that
corporations could themselves incur criminal liability.""' The
Nuremberg tribunal even declared that international crimes "are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international
law be enforced."ll2 Proponents of corporate liability under
international law contend that the Allies dissolved German corporations
to make assets available for reparations to victims of the corporations'
activities during the war.1 13
The Nuremberg trials nevertheless provided a foundation for a line
of ATS cases against corporations. In 1995, the Kadic court held that
an ATS action could be brought against both state actors and private
individuals, noting that the Nuremberg trials had established that
individuals could be held liable for certain crimes under international
law.1 14 In Doe v.. Unocal Corp., the first ATS case to address corporate
liability, the district court noted that, under Kadic, certain crimes do not
require state action and may be perpetrated by a "private party" for ATS
108. See Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 753 (D. Md. 2010)
("There is no basis for differentiating between private individuals and corporations in
this respect since '[a] private corporation is a juridical person and has no per se
immunity under U.S. domestic or international law."'); Peter Muchlinski,
Corporations in International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW T 52 (2014) (concluding that "[t]here is no general international
corporate law as such and the recognition of international legal personality for
corporations remains elusive").
109. See generally Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg's Legacy Continues: The
Nuremberg Trials' Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts under the
Alien Tort Statute, 71 ALB. L. REv. 321 (2008).
110. Id.
111. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 57 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
112. Judgement: The Law of the Charter, NUREMBERG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) (emphasis
added).
113. Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).
114. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995).
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liability to attach.I The court adopted this view and applied it to claims
against Unocal Corporation, presuming that Kadic had encompassed
both individuals and corporations within the meaning of "private
party."11 6 After Doe v. Unocal Corp., other courts have similarly
presumed corporate liability under the ATS, producing a "cascade of
missed issues,"117 to uphold corporate liability under the ATS. 18
It was not until 2005 that courts began to legitimately question the
presumption of corporate liability under the ATS. Judge Weinstein, in
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, noticed that "none of
[the ATS decisions preceding it] had addressed the liability of
corporations under the ATS" and that the decisions were "inconsistent
with the assertion that no claim under the ATS can be brought against
corporations."' 19 In 2007, the Second Circuit finally acknowledged that
previous courts had drawn "no distinction between a corporation and
an individual," and that the question of corporate liability under the
ATS had merely "lurk[ed] in the record."1 20 The panel, addressed the
implications of the Nuremberg trials and whether customary
international law extended liability to corporations, in addition to
individuals and states. 121 It concluded that the question was unsettled
under customary international law and held that claims against
apartheid-era corporations in South Africa were therefore subject to
dismissal.1 22
115. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
116. Id. at 890-891.
117. Ku, supra note 100, at 390.
118. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009)
(citing Romero as authority for corporate liability under the ATS); Romero v.
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (1lth Cir. 2008) (citing Aldana as authority for
corporate liability under the ATS); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d
1242 (11th Cir. 2005) (not directly addressing corporate liability).
119. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d at 58-59. Even after
this 2005 realization, in 2009 the district court in In re South African Apartheid
Litigation presumed corporate liability and declined to "reopen a long-settled
question." 617 F. Supp. 2d at 254-55.
120. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'1 Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 321 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted).
121. Id. at 321-26.
122. Id. at 326.
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In 2013, the Second Circuit determined in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum that Sosal23 had directed courts to look to international law
- not domestic law - to determine whether corporations could be held
liable for international torts.124 The panel accordingly applied Sosa's
standard to corporate liability under international law, as it would to a
substantive norm of international law. 125 In doing so, it found that
corporate liability under international law did not rest on a specific,
universal, and obligatory norm. 126 Judge Cabranes declared that "for the
foreseeable future, the [ATS] does not provide subject-matter
jurisdiction over claims against corporations."127
Judge Cabranes' view, however, has proven to be the minority
view. Courts in the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits have since held that corporations are subject to liability under
the ATS. 128 The D.C. Circuit rejected Judge Cabranes' reasoning that
corporate liability under international law must rest on a norm of
customary international law, holding instead that "domestic law, i.e.
federal common law, supplies the source of law on the question of
corporate liability." 129 Judge Posner from the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that, even supposing that corporate liability did not exist under
customary international law, "[t]here is always a first time for litigation
to enforce a norm; there has to be."1 30 Moreover, a district court within
the Second Circuit declined to follow Kiobel, deciding that corporations
can be held liable under the ATS via domestic law. 131 Corporate
123. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) ("A related
consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such
as a corporation or individual.").
124. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 621 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2010).
125. Id. at 131.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 149.
128. Krishanthi v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-CV-5395, 2011 WL 2607108 (D.N.J.
2011); Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2010); Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 527 Fed. Appx.
7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir.
2011); Romero v. Drummond, 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008); Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
129. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 57.
130. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017.
131. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 463-65 (2014).
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liability under the ATS for violations of international law has therefore
been acknowledged by a strong consensus.
D. State Action and Indirect Liability
Whether the defendant is a corporation or an individual, state action
is required to litigate a successful ATS claim. The general rule is that a
private actor can be held liable under the ATS if the violation of
international law was committed under color of law. 132 Some forms of
conduct are considered so egregious that they violate international law
whether committed by a private or state actor. 133 So far, courts have
determined that nonstate actors can be liable for war crimes, slave
trading, genocide, and the three Blackstone torts. 134
If the conduct at issue does not meet the state action requirement or
one of the exceptions, plaintiffs may also sue corporations for a
violation of international law under a theory of indirect liability, such
as aiding and abetting. But in a 2004 ATS suit against apartheid-era
South African corporations, a New York district court ruled that aiding
and abetting international law violations was not a universally
recognized theory of civil liability. 135 The court noted that, while aiding
and abetting was a theory of criminal liability, it was "uncertain in
application" in the civil context. 13 6 Similarly, in a 2009 ATS suit against
a bank for providing services that facilitated terrorist organizations, the
Litle district court held that there was "no basis for the judicial creation
of a federal law of contribution under the ATS."1 37 The court stated that,
indisputably, "no international law norm provides those who violate
international law with a right to seek contribution against a third party"
132. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-39, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) ("A private
individual acts under color of law ... when he acts together with state officials or with
significant state aid.").
133. Id. at 239.
134. See, e.g., In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1331 (S.D.
Fla. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 73 n.2, vacated on other grounds,
527 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). (Blackstone torts); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (slave trading, genocide and war crimes).
135. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
136. Id. at 550 (quoting Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181-82 (1994)).
137. Litle v. Arab Bank, 611 F. Supp. 2d 233, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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and that such a right is not universally recognized even within the
United States. 138
Nevertheless, courts have freely imported theories of indirect
criminal liability into the civil context for ATS cases. In its 2007
Khulumuni decision, the Second Circuit reversed a district court
holding that aiding and abetting international law violations could not
provide a basis for ATS jurisdiction against apartheid-era South African
corporations.1 39 Judge Katzmann, in his concurrence, surveyed
international law extensively and found that aiding and abetting liability
was a norm of customary international law. 140 Although he concluded
that the district court erred in reaching the opposite conclusion, Judge
Katzmann never discussed aiding and abetting liability in international
law in the civil context, which was the very root of the district court's
uncertainty. He concluded that aiding and abetting liability is found
when a defendant "(1) provides practical assistance to the principal
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and (2)
does so with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that
crime." 41 Since then, aiding and abetting civil liability under the ATS
has gained wide acceptance among U.S. federal courts. 142
IV. KIOBEL: OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The Supreme Court finally revisited the ATS in 2013, originally to
review the Second Circuit's decision that corporations could not be held
liable for violations of international law under the ATS. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court determined that the presumption against
extraterritoriality precludes ATS claims regarding torts committed in
138. Id.
139. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 270-76.
141. Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
142. Aiding and abetting claims against corporations may turn on whether the
court applies a "purpose" or "knowledge" standard. See, e.g., Mastafa v. Chevron
Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that plaintiffs' assertions that
defendants acted "knowingly" were insufficient for aiding and abetting liability); but
see Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that
knowledge satisfies the mens rea requirement of aiding and abetting).
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foreign territory. 14 3 Nigerian nationals sued Shell Oil Company's
Nigerian subsidiary under the ATS, claiming it was complicit in human
rights violations.144 Regarding whether "a claim may reach conduct
occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign," the Court held that a
claim under the ATS must "touch and concern" the United States "with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application." 14 5 The Court noted that foreign policy concerns are "all
the more pressing when the question is whether a cause of action under
the ATS reaches conduct within the territory of another sovereign." 146
Since "all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States,"
the claims did not touch and concern the United States with sufficient
force to rebut the presumption. 14 7 While the Court did not directly
address corporate liability under the ATS, it tacitly accepted it by
alluding to the fact that corporations with sufficient contacts in the
United States could be held liable under the ATS.1 4 8
As Justice Alito noted in his concurrence, the Court leaves open the
question of the statute's extraterritorial reach. 14 9 Kiobel's holding is
limited, because both the plaintiffs (Nigerians) and defendants (Dutch,
British and Nigerian corporations) were foreign, and all relevant
conduct took place abroad.150 The Court did not address what might
constitute "relevant conduct" sufficient to overcome the presumption,
and whether the nationality of the parties was a meaningful factor.1 5
The Court did mention that "mere corporate presence" in the United
States would not suffice, given the ubiquity of MNCs, but that was the
extent of its guidance.1 5 2 In his concurrence, Justice Breyer argued that
jurisdiction under the ATS should be found if the defendant is a U.S.
143. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
144. Id. at 1662.
145. Id. at 1164, 1669.
146. Id. at 1665.
147. Id. at 1669.
148. Id. (holding that "mere corporate presence" in the United States would not
suffice to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality).
149. Id. at 1669-70 (Alito, J., concurring).
150. Nigerian plaintiffs had sued Dutch, British and Nigerian corporations
alleging that they aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing human
rights abuses against the Ogoni people in Nigeria. Id. at 1662-63.
151. See id at 1669.
152. Id.
2016] 21
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national, but disagreed that the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies in the first place. 153 Ultimately, "the Kiobel majority answered
the question before the Court in the negative, providing only 'under
what circumstances' a court may not recognize a cause of action under
the ATS."1 54
Contrary to Justice Breyer's concurrence, courts tend to agree that
a U.S. defendant alone is not sufficient to provide ATS subject-matter
jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit in Mujica v. AirScan, Inc. held that the
mere fact that the defendants were both U.S. corporations "is not
enough to establish that the ATS claims here touch and concern the
United States with sufficient force."155 The panel noted that in all post-
Kiobel cases in which the presumption against extraterritoriality was
overcome, "the plaintiffs ... alleged that at least some of the conduct
relevant to their claims occurred in the United States." 156 The panel,
however, acknowledged that "U.S. citizenship or corporate status is one
factor that, in conjunction with other factors, can establish a sufficient
connection between an ATS claim and [the United States] to satisfy
Kiobel." 57
By contrast, the Second Circuit held that the nationality of the
defendant is immaterial, and that the location of the alleged violations
of international law is the only consideration in the Kiobel analysis.158
The Eleventh Circuit in Doe v. Drummond disagreed, reasoning that
Kiobel specifically "did not exclude the significance of U.S
citizenship," by noting that mere corporate presence would not
suffice.1 59 The Drummond panel ruled that its defendants-two U.S.
153. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
154. Doe v. Drummond, 782 F.3d 576, 585 (11th Cir. 2015).
155. Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotations omitted). See also Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, 760 F.3d 1185, 1189
(11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting plaintiffs' "attempt to anchor ATS jurisdiction in the nature
of the defendants as United States corporations").
156. Mujica, 771 F.3d at 595.
157. Id.
158. Balintulo v. Daimler, 727 F.3d 174, 190 (2nd Cir. 2013) ("Nothing in the
Court's reasoning in Kiobel suggests that the rule of law it applied somehow depends
on a defendant's citizenship."); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 185 (2nd
Cir. 2014) (looking "solely to the site of the alleged violations of customary
international law" accordingly with Balintulo).
159. Doe v. Drummond, 782 F.3d 576, 594 (11th Cir. 2015).
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corporations - maintained more than mere corporate presence by being
incorporated in a state and having their principal places of business in
the United States. 160 While this did not "firmly secure" ATS
jurisdiction, the panel stated that their corporate status "can guide us in
our navigation of the touch and concern inquiry." 61 With the exception
of the Second Circuit, courts have found that the nationality of a
defendant in an ATS suit is relevant to overcoming the presumption
against extraterritoriality, especially if the defendant corporation
maintains more than mere presence in the United States.
The "relevant conduct" analysis is fact-intensive, but post-Kiobel
case law generally demonstrates that the presumption against
extraterritoriality can be overcome by specific allegations of decisions
and transactions in the United States that contribute to injuries abroad.
In Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., the plaintiffs overcame the presumption
by showing several specific instances of conduct by Chevron and BNP
in the United States that had an indirect impact on human rights
violations in Iraq. 162 They alleged that Chevron and BNP had
contributed to human rights abuses by the Hussein regime by
purchasing and financing Iraqi oil, "facilitating" a surcharge payment
to the regime, recouping profits, and allowing payments through a U.S.
escrow account that included kickbacks to the Hussein regime - all in
the United States. 163 The Second Circuit panel concluded that the
alleged conduct was sufficiently "specific and domestic" to overcome
the presumption against extraterritoriality.1 64 A New Jersey district
court recently refused to overturn subject-matter jurisdiction under the
ATS in light of Kiobel, even though all the alleged injuries occurred
abroad.1 65 The defendants had allegedly hosted members of the
perpetrator terrorist organization in the United States, contributed
money to the U.S. branch of an organization that funneled money to the
organization, and provided funds to bribe U.S. officials in attempts to
remove the organization from the list of Foreign Terrorist
160. Id.
161. Id. at 595.
162. Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 190-91.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 191.
165. Krishanthi v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-CV-5395, 2014 WL 1669873, at *10
(D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014).
232016]
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Organizations. 166 Furthermore, a Maryland district court suggested that
ATS claims could be brought against defendants whose products are
used primarily for committing violations of international law. 16 7 In sum,
ATS plaintiffs have failed to overcome the presumption when their
claims were not specific, too conclusory, or alleged only irrelevant U.S.
contacts. 168 These claims did not fail merely because all of the injuries
occurred abroad. 169
V. POST-KIOBEL: ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
Post-Kiobel courts consider whether an ATS defendant had
contacts in the United States and whether the defendant's conduct in the
United States contributed to international law violations committed
abroad. The presumption against extraterritoriality tends to narrow the
focus of potential litigation to U.S. corporations whose decision-makers
operate in the United States, especially PMCs. 170
Scholars recognize that MNCs in general 71 play an increasingly
greater role in the United Nations system. 172 While states agonize over
166. Id.
167. Du Daobin v. Cisco Systems, 2 F. Supp. 3d 717, 728 (D. Md. 2014).
168. See, e.g., Doe v. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 591 (holding that an employee's
obtaining consent in the United States to provide support to a perpetrator of war
crimes, as well as frequent travel to the United States, was not sufficient to overcome
the presumption against extraterritoriality in an ATS suit against a multinational coal
mining company).
169. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., 758 F.3d 516, 528 (4th Cir. 2014)
("[I]t is not sufficient merely to say that because the actual injuries were inflicted
abroad, the claims d6 not touch and concern United States territory.").
170. See generally Jenny S. Lam, Comment, Accountability for Private
Military Contractors under the Alien Tort Statute, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1459, 1460
(2009) (reporting that the United States and Britain together account for more than
70% of annual spending on PMCs).
171. Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility to Protect": Humanitarian
Concern and the Lawfulness ofArmed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 704 (2007)
("Intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational
corporations, and even the individual person have all acquired recognized status under
international law.").
172. B. S. Chimini, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State
in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2004) (the author attributes the increased
influence of MNCs to the "abandonment of attempts to adopt a code of conduct for
25
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international law principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, 17 3
MNCs thrive as their influence moves across borders unhindered by
such restrictive notions. 17 4 State control has declined due to
privatization, globalization, and the expansion of MNCs. 175 One writer
goes so far as to say that MNCs "appear to be on the brink of
superseding the state as the basis of international affairs." 176
Data from 2004 estimated a total of 500,000 MNCs and foreign
affiliates, 177 and the extent of foreign direct investment (FDI) is not
entirely known. The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
reported in 2010 that FDI increasingly "has significant social, and often
political, ramifications" and that there is a great demand for new
statistical information to measure FDI activities.1 78
transnational corporations" and the "marginalization of development issues in the UN
system.").
173. See generally Eric Allen Engle, The Transformation of the International
Legal System: The Post- Westphalian Legal Order, 23 Q.L.R. 23 (2004).
174. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1779 n. 163 (2003) ("These dynamics help
explain current anxieties over forces that evade territorial control such as
multinational corporations, immigration, and the internet."). See generally Anthony
Smith, States and Homelands: The Social and Geopolitical Implications of National
Territory, 10 MILLENNIUM 187 (1981).
175. Andrew Barry, Ethical Capitalism, in GLOBAL GOVERNMENTALITY:
GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL SPACES 195, 202 (Wendy Larner & William Walters
eds., 2004).
176. Laura Cruz et al., Policy Point-Counterpoint: Is Westphalia History?, 80
INT'L Soc. SCI. REV. 151, 153 (2005). See also Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in
Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State
Sovereignty, 25 B. C. INT'L. COMP. L. REV. 235, 236 (2002) ("[S]tates no longer
dominate the international landscape, as international organizations and private actors
(e.g., multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even
individuals) exercise increasing influence in the creation, implementation, and
enforcement of international norms.").
177. CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
RULES FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 24-27 (2005) (estimating the existence of at least
6,400 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 44,000 international NGOs, 500,000
MNCs and foreign affiliates, and 6.3 billion persons).
178. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 2 UNCTAD Training
Manual on Statistics for FDI and the Operations of TNCs: Statistics on the Operations
of Transnational Corporations, 35 (2009).
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MVNCs are generally perceived as the enemies of human rights
because they allegedly exploit and abuse labor,1 79 damage the
environment,180 introduce unsafe products and technologies,181 displace
local businesses, 182 displace indigenous peoples, 183 and support regimes
that violate the human rights of their peoples. 184 In Sudan, for example,
Standard Oil has been accused of being complicit with the Sudanese
government in the genocide of civilians to clear the way for oil
production and transportation. 85
179. See, e.g., Hope Lewis, Embracing Complexity: Human Rights in Critical
Race Feminist Perspective, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 510, 519 (2003)
("Transnational corporations exploit the low-wage status of women.").
180. Pauline Abadie, A New Story ofDavid and Goliath: The Alien Tort Claims
Act Gives Victims ofEnvironmental Injustice in the Developing World a Viable Claim
Against Multinational Corporations, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 745, 745 (2004);
Daniel Aguirre, Multinational Corporations and the Realisation ofEconomic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 53, 56 (2004); Francis 0. Adeola,
Environmental Injustice and Human Rights Abuse: The States, MNCs, and Repression
of Minority Groups in the World System, 8 HuM. ECOLOGY REv. 39, 43-44 (2001);
Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, Access to Justice: Human Rights Abuses Involving
Corporations in Philippines, www.icj.org/access-to-justice-human-rights-abuses-
involving-corporations-in-philippines/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
181. Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for
Transnational Corporations, 25 ENVTL. L. 1, 8-10 (1995). See generally Dinah
Shelton, Challenges to the Future of Civil and Political Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 669, 674-81 (1998).
182. ERIC REGRAFF & MICHAEL W. HANSEN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND LOCAL FIRMs IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 19 (2011).
183. Upendra Baxi, What Happens Next Is up to You: Human Rights at Risk in
Dams and Development, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1507, 1509-10 (2001); Erin K.
MacDonald, Playing by the Rules: The World Bank's Failure to Adhere to Policy in
the Funding of Large-Scale Hydropower Projects, 31 ENVTL. L. 1011, 1030-39
(2001).
184. Megan Wells Sheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to
Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 483, 483-84 (2011) ("BITs empower
MNCs and encumber a State's regulatory power to promote and protect human
rights.").
185. Hannibal Travis, Genocide in Sudan: The Role of Oil Exploration and the
Entitlement of the Victims to Reparations, 25 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2008)
("Multinational corporations therefore play a role in arming a genocidal regime and
perpetuating an apathetic intemational response."). See also Larry Cata Backer,
Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations' Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social
Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 287 (2006).
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In particular, PMCs hired by the U.S. military inherently touch and
concern the United States. In Al Shimari, the Fourth Circuit found that
the conduct of private civilian interrogators contracted by the U.S.
military in Iraq sufficiently touched and concerned the United States
because: (1) the interrogators were employed by CACI, a U.S.
corporation; (2) the interrogators were U.S. citizens; (3) CACI's
contract was issued in the United States by the U.S. Department of the
Interior and required CACI interrogators to obtain security clearances
in the United States; and (4) CACI managers in the United States
approved and encouraged acts abroad that violated international law.1 86
In other words, the "relevant conduct" analysis coincides with the very
nature of U.S. PMCs, in that they form contracts with the U.S.
government in the United States and make decisions in the United
States to direct conduct abroad.187 One pre-Kiobel commentator has
highlighted the potential for ATS litigation against PMCs, arguing that
human rights abuses committed by PMCs abroad should overcome the
various legal obstacles that ATS plaintiffs usually face.188 Given the
fast-growing use of PMCs' 89 and the prospect that Kiobel poses a
relatively negligible threat to ATS suits against PMC defendants,
Kiobel may have funneled ATS litigation toward PMCs.
A. U.S. Drone Strikes
The United States' use of drones to combat terrorists abroad could
open the door to ATS liability against civilian contractors involved with
their operation. Civilian contractors are needed behind the scenes of
186. Id. at 530-31.
187. See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 9-18 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 2007).
188. Lam, supra note 170, at 1465.
189. Adam Ebrahim, Going to War with the Army You Can Afford: The United
States, International Law, and the Private Military Industry, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 181
(2000) (discussing the possibility of a "private humanitarian intervention regime,"
noting the "increasing numbers of multinational corporations, nongovernmental
organizations, and regional organizations" employing private military companies
(PMCs); P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED
MILYTARY INDUSTRY 9-18, 80 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the
expanded use of PMCs by corporations, international organizations, and non-
governmental organizations and noting that PMC customers include "legitimate
sovereign states, respected multinational corporations, and humanitarian NGOs").
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drone operations to analyze surveillance videos and gather intelligence
used to identify and target enemies. 190 Although civilian contractors do
not make the final decision to strike, their intelligence-gathering
functions are regarded as those of a "targeteer" because they are "very
closely associated" with the decision to strike.191 Thus, the actions of
civilian contractors sometimes play a key role in drone strikes that
violate international law. Indeed, a mistaken U.S. drone strike that
killed fifteen Afghan civilians and zero combatants in 2010 "was
largely based upon intelligence analysis conducted and reported by a
civilian contractor."1 92
Susceptibility to civilian-guided drone mis-strikes is likely to
increase as the United States expands its drone operations and demands
more civilian contractors to conduct them.1 93 One drone mission alone
requires hundreds of personnel; the Predator drone requires 160 to 180
personnel per mission, and the larger Global Hawk drone requires 300
to 500 per mission. 194 Moreover, the drone has become the United
States' "weapon of choice"; 195 the Obama administration has launched
500 drone strikes and operates around-the-clock surveillance
190. David S. Cloud, Civilian contractors playing key roles in U.S. drone
operations, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, http://articles.1atimes.com/2011/dec/29/
world/la-fg-drones-civilians-20111230 ("America's growing operations rely on
hundreds of civilian contractors, including some ... who work in the so-called kill
chain before Hellfire missiles are launched.") [hereinafter Cloud]. See also Pratap
Chatterjee, Meet 11 of the Private Defense Contractors That Are Raking It in from the
Drone War, CORPWATCH, (Aug. 5, 2015) http://www.alternet.org/news-amp-
politics/meet-11 -private-defense-contractors-are-raking-it-drone-war (listing
contractors providing "Imagery Analyst" services to the U.S. government).
191. Duane Thompson, Civilians in the Air Force Distributed Common Ground
System (DCGS), X JOINT CENTER FOR OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS J., 18, 23-24 (2008)
(describing individuals performing "targeteer" functions as "[p]ersons who relay
target identification for an imminent real-world mission to persons causing actual
harm to enemy personnel or equipment").
192. Cloud, supra note 190.
193. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, supra note 3.
194. ANN HAGEDORN, THE INVISIBLE SOLDIERS: How AMERICA OUTSOURCED
OUR SECURITY 243 (2014).
195. Daniel Byman, Why Drones Work, 92 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 32 (July 2013)
("Obama has signed off on over 400 [drone strikes] in the last four years, making the
program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.").
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missions. 196 The United States has made plans to increase its active
worldwide drone missions from about 65 to 90 in 2019.197 One drone
expert noted the United States' "desperation" to keep up with demand,
and predicts that a shortage of drone pilots will force the United States
to use civilian contractors to conduct deadly strikes. 198 President
Trump's continuation of Obama's drone program as part of his effort to
"eradicate radical Islamic terrorism" could accelerate the use of civilian
contractors in drone strikes, depending on how the United States plans
to incorporate drones in its anti-terrorism strategy going forward. 199
This article does not propose that drone strikes by the United States
to combat terrorism violate international law, but rather that challenges
to their legality might create an area of opportunity for ATS litigants
when civilian contractors are involved. Drone strikes could be found to
violate provisions ofjus ad bellum (law governing the resort to military
force), international humanitarian law (law of armed conflict), and
international human rights law,200 for which courts are likely to
recognize-or have already recognized-causes of action under Sosa.
B. Jus Ad Bellum
U.S. drone strikes could violate the jus ad bellum protection of
territorial integrity established in the U.N. Charter, which provides only
196. Jack Serle & Abigail Fielding-Smith, Monthly drone report: Total drone
strikes under Obama in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen now 491 after September
attacks, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Oct. 5, 2015),
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ 2 015/10/05/monthly-drone-report-total-
drone-strikes-under-obama-in-pakistan-somalia-and-yemen-now-49 1-after-
september-attacks/ [hereinafter Drone Report]; Michael Flynn, Employing ISR SOF
Best Practices, 50 Joint Force Quarterly 56, 57 (2008).
197. Paul Shinkman, A Slippery Slope for Drone Warfare?, U.S. NEWS (Aug.
21, 2015) http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/ 2 0 15/08/21/pentagon-opening-
drone-missions-to-private-contractors.
198. Another commentator, a law professor at the University of Notre Dame,
also predicts that the United States "may be tempted in the future to move contractors
from assisting with drone maintenance and the like to killing with them." Id.
199. Micah Zenko, VOICE
Trump Could Take Obama's Drone War Further Into the Shadows, FOREIGN POLICY
GROUP (Feb. 2, 2017) http://foreignpolicy.com/ 2 017/02/02/the-uc-<iout-lovup-
with-trump-on-counterterrorism/.
200. See generally Mary O'Connell, Remarks: The Resort to Drones under
International Law, 39 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 585 (2011).
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a narrow exception in the case of self-defense. 20 1 Generally, the United
States can use force against terrorists in a foreign country without
violating its territorial integrity if (1) the strikes are necessary and
proportionate 202 acts of self-defense and the country itself has failed to
deal with the terrorists to the point of effectively acquiescing in their
hostilities; or (2) the country has given the United States permission to
conduct the strikes, regardless of whether they constitute self-
defense.203 Commentators disagree as to whether the United States has
permission to conduct drone strikes in places such as Pakistan and
Somalia.204 Apart from the question of permission, the U.S. State
Department Legal Advisor and other advocates argue that the strikes
are acts of self-defense against threatened terrorist attacks, while
opponents contend that international law does not permit anticipatory
(or "preemptive") self-defense.205
The force of the legal principles of territorial integrity and self-
defense in an ATS lawsuit is uncertain but promising for plaintiffs. U.S.
courts have been hesitant to recognize a cause of action under the ATS
for provisions found in non-self-executing treaties, but ATS litigants
could make an argument that the protection of territorial integrity and
201. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; art. 51.
202. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 94, ¶ 176 (June 27).
203. S.C. Res. 748, ¶508 (Mar. 31, 1992) ("[E]very state has the duty to refrain
from . .. acquiescing in activities within its territory directed towards the commission
of [hostile acts against other states], when such acts involve a threat or use of force.");
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on
Targeted Killings, ¶ 29, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 at
11-12 (May28, 2010).
204. Compare O'Connell, supra note 200, at 592, with Andrew C. Orr, Note,
Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The Status ofAmerican Drone Strikes
in Pakistan Under International Law, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 729, 737 (2011). See
also David Ignatius, A Quiet Deal with Pakistan, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/03/AR2008110
302638.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
205. See Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, The Obama
Administration and International Law, Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/ 139119.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2016); Orr, supra note 204, at 740-41. But see O'Connell, supra
note 200, at 593; Sikander Shah, War on Terrorism: SelfDefense, Operation Enduring
Freedom, and the Legality ofthe U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REv. 77, 100 (2010).
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self-defense requirements are norms of customary international law 20 6
that are sufficiently universal, specific, and obligatory under Sosa to
support a cause of action.
C. International Humanitarian Law
ATS litigants could bring ATS causes of action alleging violations
of international humanitarian law if U.S. drone strikes are deemed not
to be acts of self-defense but rather part of an ongoing armed conflict.2 07
For example, they could allege that a U.S. drone strike that kills
civilians violated the jus in bello principles of distinction and
proportionality arising from Common Article III of the Geneva
Conventions, which limits the use of force to military objectives and
prohibits the excessive killing of civilians. 208 This could be the most
viable claim under the ATS, given the controversial number of civilian
deaths resulting from U.S. drone strikes. The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism reported that U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan have killed
between 423 and 965 civilians since 2004.209 That represents between
10% and 39% of the estimated 2,476 to 3,989 combatants killed in
Pakistan.210 Defenders contend that drones are better at delivering
precision strikes and kill fewer civilians. 211
Aside from whether the killing of civilians in a U.S. drone strike
would lead to a successful ATS claim, it could at least provide the basis
for a cognizable cause of action under the ATS. The Geneva
Conventions as well as the principles of distinction and proportionality
206. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J., at 174; Shah, supra note 205, at 90-92.
207. See Koh, supra note 205 (describing the United States' use of force against
al-Qaeda as part of an "ongoing armed conflict").
208. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under
International Humanitarian Law, 90 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 991, 995 (2008); I
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts and
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
209. Drone Report, supra note 196.
210. Id.
211. Byman, supra note 195; Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), I 37-39, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (Sep.
13, 2013) [hereinafter UN Report 2013].
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are widely considered part of customary international law,2 12 and courts
have already recognized a cause of action under ATS for violations of
Common Article III. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit recognized a cause of
action based on Common Article III against a mining corporation that
used military force against civilians to suppress a revolt. 213 The panel
stated that Common Article III provided a definition of war crimes
"sufficiently specific, obligatory, and universal to give rise to an ATS
claim." 214 A Florida district court also recognized a cause of action,
based on Common Article III, against a corporation that allegedly
supported the killing of noncombatants in the course of an armed
conflict.2 15
D. International Human Rights Law
International human rights law could also support a cause of action
for extrajudicial killing or summary execution, 2 16 which applies both
during and outside armed conflicts. 217 For example, in 2003 the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary Executions
determined that a U.S. drone strike against suspected terrorists in
Yemen constituted "a clear case of extrajudicial killing." 218 A 2013 UN
report affirmed that drone strikes are subject to international human
rights law and stated that a particular drone strike could violate the right
212. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 78-
79 (July 8, 1996); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Exec. Rep. 101-30, at 15 (1990) ("the Geneva
Conventions, to which the United States and virtually all other countries are
Parties ... generally reflect customary international law.").
213. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
214. Id. at 764.
215. In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., Alien Tort Statute & S'holder Derivative
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
216. The killing of civilians is only permissible under international human
rights law when it is necessary to combat an imminent threat to life. UN Report 2013,
supra note 211, T 35.
217. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ¶¶ 24-25.
218. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions,
U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions
of Disappearances and Summary Executions, T 37-39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/3
(Jan. 13, 2003).
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to life if not carried out accordingly. 219 And as with war crimes
involving civilian deaths, U.S. courts have recognized causes of action
under the ATS for extrajudicial killing and summary execution, even
after Sosa.220 The TVPA's explicit recognition of the prohibition
against extrajudicial killing is particularly strong evidence that it is part
of binding customary international law.221
VI. CONCLUSION
The rise, fall and resurrection of the ATS has resulted in a new body
of international tort law. After many years of uncertainty regarding the
applicability of the statute, in 2004, the Supreme Court established a
judge-made cause of action for violations of customary international
law. Courts then reached a consensus that corporations, as well as
individuals, could be held civilly liable for violations of international
law under the ATS, despite the novelty of corporate civil liability under
international law. Finally, in 2013, the Supreme Court held in Kiobel
that the ATS is limited by the presumption against extraterritoriality.
As a result, ATS litigation has become focused on defendants that make
decisions and execute transactions in the United States that contribute
to violations of international law abroad. Kiobel is likely to narrow the
focus of ATS litigation to transnational torts committed by U.S. MNCs,
especially U.S. PMCs that participate in the production and deployment
of drones.
219. UN Report 2013, supra note 211, ¶ 24, 47.
220. See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1164,
1178-79 (C.D. Cal. 2005); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The prohibition against summary
execution ... [is] universal, definable, and obligatory.").
221. See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
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